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During a long period after World War II, global trade grew several times faster than global GDP. Since 2012, however, the world may have entered a period of trade growth that is almost in line with GDP growth. 
Is this pattern cyclical or structural? Can value-added trade data 
and information on global value chains (GVCs) help explain these 
developments? Are GVCs, which involve intermediate products 
crossing national borders, unwinding? What does this trend 
mean for developing countries? This chapter addresses these 
questions through in-depth analysis of available trade and global 
input- output statistics.
The chapter looks first at the changing patterns of trade in 
global intermediate goods during the last two decades and ana-
lyzes the major factors driving these changes. Then it describes 
the structural change in global production and analyzes its rel-
evance for the recent global trade slowdown by distinguishing 
GVC and non-GVC activities in GDP and final goods production. 
Last, it discusses the income distribution issues resulting from 
the development of GVCs and potential contributions to recent 
trade slowdowns and the growing antiglobalization sentiment. It 
does this by numerically estimating the “smile curve,” a graphical 
outline of the value-added potential of each production stage in 
a value chain for various industries, based on recently developed 
GVC length and participation indexes (box 2.1).
The value-added creation structure that has emerged during 
the slow economic recovery since 2012 is quite different from the 
three previous growth periods of the last 20 years. First, there 
has been a reduction in cross-country production sharing in com-
plex GVCs during the current economic recovery, contrary to the 
rapid production globalization driven by the growth of complex 
GVC activities in previous periods. Second, again unlike the pro-
duction structure of the previous economic growth periods, the 
recent economic recovery has been driven mainly by traditional 
trade to satisfy foreign demand and pure domestic production 
activities in the United States and several major emerging econo-
mies, such as China. Third, participation in simple GVCs has been 
mixed, rising in some developed economies but falling in most 
emerging Asian economies.
GVC production length (the average number of production 
stages between primary inputs and final products) has short-
ened, reflecting mainly the declining number of national border 
crossings. The production length before and after national 
border crossings has actually increased, indicating the poten-
tial deepening division of labor within national borders despite 
the decline in cross-border production-sharing activities. The 
reduced number of national border crossings for production can 
be observed in all countries, regardless of whether their GDP 
grew or shrank during this period.
Changes in the global production structure are consistent 
with three factors. First is the rising tide of protection around 
the globe after the global financial crisis. Second is the substitu-
tion of domestically produced intermediate inputs for imported 
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intermediate inputs in major emerging developing economies, 
such as China. And third is the technology innovation and reshor-
ing that deepened the domestic division of labor for major devel-
oped economies, such as Japan and the United States. Whether 
such changes are temporary or permanent can be determined 
only as more data become available.
Complex GVCs were the most important driving force for 
globalization and the growth of global GDP during 1995–2000 
and 2000–08. But during 2012–15, complex GVC–related cross-
border production-sharing activities declined. Industry upgrad-
ing occurred within emerging economies, especially in China, 
accompanied by a decline in processing trade. Trade protection-
ism has increased because of the slow pace of economic recov-
ery after the financial crisis.
Smile curves show that countries and sectors, depending on 
their position and degree of participation, can show very dif-
ferent value added and job gains along GVCs. Joining a GVC 
increases economic efficiency, but this can have a distributional 
impact.
Intermediate trade in manufactured goods and 
global business cycles
The global economy recently went through three short down-
turns centered on the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, the 2000–01 
dot-com bust, and the 2008–09 global financial crisis (figure 2.1). 
The global financial crisis precipitated the only global reces-
sion, defined by negative GDP growth for a period of at least 
two consecutive quarters. And it seems to have had a struc-
tural impact on the global economy, both on economic growth 
and on patterns of trade. Global GDP grew at about 4% a year 
during the precrisis and postrecovery periods of both the Asian 
financial crisis and the dot-com bust, suggesting that about 4% 
is the steady state for the world economy. GDP growth initially 
recovered to about 4% after the global financial crisis but then 
fell back and stabilized at roughly 2.5%, hinting that structural 
factors in addition to cyclical factors may be affecting global 
economic growth (see figure 2.1).
The 2008–09 global financial crisis may have also changed 
the pattern of global trade. Unlike the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
the global financial crisis had large negative impacts on both the 
level and the growth of trade. The rapid trade growth from 2001 
to 2008 contrasts sharply with the much slower growth starting 
in 2009. The decline in intermediate goods trade in 2015 pushes 
the world economy closer to precrisis levels, thus challenging the 
recovery six years after the crisis. There seems to be a clear link 
between the patterns of trade and the global business cycle. What 
roles have cross-country production sharing and GVCs played in 
such a global business cycle? As GVCs involve intermediate goods 
crossing national borders, trade in such goods provides the first 
piece of information to help understand what is going on.
The evolution of global manufacturing trade from 1995 to 
2015 exhibits six phases (see figure 2.1). The Asian financial crisis 
severely damaged domestic demand in several Asian economies 
over 1995–2000, but total manufacturing trade still grew, albeit 
slowly, and reached a low peak in 2000. Due to the dot-com bust 
in 2000–01, manufacturing trade declined slightly. In 2001–08, 
and accompanying China’s accession to the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) at the end of 2001, total manufacturing trade 
increased substantially. With the 2008–09 global financial crisis, 
however, total manufacturing trade dropped sharply. But then in 
2010–14, it showed a rapid V-shaped recovery, before dropping 
again slightly in 2014–15.
There is no clear indication of which product type contrib-
utes more to growth in total manfacturing trade, intermediate 
BOX 2.1
Identifying global value chain activities with new indicators
The rise of global value chains (GVCs) in the past two 
decades has dramatically altered the world economy. But 
with the increasing complexity and sophistication of cross-
border production- sharing activities, the use of only official 
trade data (such as gross exports and imports) and GDP 
statistics has not revealed the significance and nature of 
changes in the global business cycle. An important reason 
is that indicators based on official trade and production 
data cannot identify and distinguish which types of trade 
are GVC activities and which are not, thus making it diffi-
cult to evaluate the relation between changes in global 
trade and changes in GDP growth. This chapter introduces 
recently developed GVC indicators, which make it possible 
to decompose a country or sector’s GDP and final goods 
production into GVC and non-GVC activities (see box 2.2). 
Applying this new GVC accounting system to the most 
up-to-date intercountry input- output databases (World 
Input- Output Database 2013, 2016; Asian Development 
Bank Multi-Region Input-Output Database 20161) makes it 
possible to identify the production length (more or fewer 
production stages between primary inputs and final goods) 
and degree of participation (simple or complex) in GVCs at 
country and sector levels.
Note
1. The Asian Development Bank Multi-Region Input-Output Data-
base data cover a time-series intercountry input-output table, 
compiled by the Asian Development Bank in 2016 using the World 
Input-Output Database and other Asian countries’ input-output 
tables.
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or final goods. Trade in intermediate goods contributed more 
than trade in final goods did to the growth of total manufactur-
ing trade in 2001–08 and 2009–14 and to its decline in 2000–01 
and 2008–09 (table 2.1). Trade in final goods contributed more 
to the growth of manufacturing trade during 1995–2000 and to 
its recent decline in 2014–15.
The weight of intraregional exports in trade in intermediate 
and final manufactured goods over 1995–2015 for Europe, the 
Americas, Asia, and the rest of the world highlights the large 
shares of intraregional linkages among them (figure 2.2). It 
confirms that GVCs are organized mainly at the regional level, 
similar to findings by Baldwin and Lopez (2013) using data from 
2009.
Despite a 6% decrease in the share of intra-Europe trade in 
total European intermediate goods trade during 1995–2015 (due 
largely to the emergence of China), intra-Europe trade remained 
substantial in both exports and imports — at around 70% in 
2015 — showing that European industrial inputs originate essen-
tially from European supply chains.
The share of intra-Americas exports in intermediate goods 
trade also gradually increased (from 51% in 1995 to 58% in 2015), 
while the share of intra-Americas imports in intermediate goods 
trade drifted downward and reached its lowest point in 2015 (41%, 
down from 48% in 1995). The shares of manufacturing inputs in 
trade within both North and South America are relatively low, but 
those between North America and South America are higher. 
North American exports of intermediate goods to South America 
accounted for 14% of its total exports of intermediate goods in 
1995 and 25% in 2015. The share of South American exports to 
North America rose from 40% to 50% in the same period.
The two way intra-Asia trade in intermediate goods fluctuated 
while increasing overall between 1995 and 2015 and reached 
more than two-thirds of total manufacturing trade during 
the period. Similar to Europe, this highlights the sustainable 
TABLE 2.1 Contribution to the change in global manufacturing trade by trade type, 1995–2015
Percent
Trade type
Contribution to growth of total manufacturing trade Contribution to decline in total manufacturing trade
1995–2000 2001–08 2009–14 2000–01 2008–09 2014–15
Trade in intermediate goods 45.3 52.0 50.2 79.0 55.4 47.0
Trade in final goods 54.7 48.0 49.8 21.0 44.6 53.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-
use database, International Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 4 (2016 edition).
FIGURE 2.1 Trends in global GDP and manufacturing trade before and after recent economic downturns, 1995–2015
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industrial linkages arrangement of “Factory Asia.” About 60% of 
Asia’s exports of final manufactured goods over the period went 
to extraregional markets, but only about 40% of the Americas’ 
exports did, an imbalance that began to change after the global 
financial crisis. Compared with Asia and the Americas, Europe’s 
final goods trade has been more balanced during the last two 
decades, with a slight decline in intraregional trade from more 
than 70% in 1995 to about 66% in 2015.
GVCs are still largely regional, despite the trend of increas-
ing globalization before the recent global financial crisis (see also 
annex 2.1). Developing economies are increasingly participating 
in GVCs through exports and imports of intermediate manufac-
tured goods. And some emerging economies are upgrading 
along GVCs — for example, China tends to export more interme-
diate goods to other low-income downstream countries to sup-
port their final goods exports to the global market.
FIGURE 2.2 Evolution of intraregional trade in intermediate and final manufactured goods, 1995–2015
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Decomposing domestic value added and final 
goods production into global value chain and 
other activities
A country’s GDP by industry can be decomposed into four types 
based on whether there are cross-border production-sharing 
activities (box 2.2; Wang and others 2017a).
The first two production processes described here are pure 
domestic production activities. No domestic factor content 
crosses national borders for production purposes, so there is no 
cross-country production-sharing:1
1. Production of domestically produced and consumed value 
added, or pure domestic production. This involves domes-
tic value added produced to satisfy domestic final demand, 
with no participation in international trade; an example is a 
haircut. This is labeled V_D in the figure in box 2.2.
2. Production of value added embodied in the export of 
final goods and services, or traditional trade. This involves 
domestic value added produced to satisfy foreign final 
demand. Domestic factor content is embodied in final goods 
that cross national borders for consumption only; therefore, 
it is very similar to traditional trade, such as “French wine for 
English cloth.”2 This is labeled V_RT.
In the next two production processes, domestic value added 
is used in production activities outside the source country and 
is contributed by the source country’s production factors to 
cross-country production-sharing GVC activities:
3a. Simple cross-border production-sharing activities, or 
simple GVCs. This involves domestic value added crossing 
national borders for production only once. Value added 
is embodied in intermediate exports and used by trading 
partners to produce domestic goods consumed in the direct 
BOX 2.2
Identifying which types of production are global value chain activities and which are not
Global value chains (GVCs) depend on products and serv-
ices that are used as inputs in production processes that 
cross national borders, so the first major issue in measur-
ing GVCs is separating final and intermediate use in cus-
toms trade statistics. But thousands of products are clas-
sified by customs product codes (such as the U.S. 10-digit 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule), and even within the 10-digit 
product groups, the heterogeneity is tremendous. So prop-
erly identifying final use is not easy. Furthermore, measures 
of supply chain trade or cross-border production-sharing 
appearing in the literature — such as vertical specialization 
(Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001) and import to produce and 
import to export (Baldwin and Lopez 2013) — are recursive 
concepts with pervasive double counting.
To overcome these difficulties, factor content or value-
added trade is emerging as the mainstream measure of 
cross-border production-sharing activities. Since produc-
tion factors such as land, labor, and capital are relatively 
easy to classify, production activities based on factor con-
tent can be classified according to a uniform standard, 
which makes analytical work tractable. When traditional 
trade dominated international commerce, factors were 
less mobile across countries, and factor content embodied 
in final goods crossed national borders only for consump-
tion. In today’s world economy dominated by regional and 
global value chains, some production factors directly cross 
a national border, such as foreign direct investment, while 
many others still do not but are instead embedded in final 
and intermediate trade flows across national borders.
The production decomposition method used in this 
report, based on System of National Accounts standards 
and adopted from Wang and others (2017a), classifies 
embedded factor content as GVC or non-GVC activities 
according to whether they cross national borders for pro-
duction. Value-added creation is classified as a GVC activ-
ity only when embedded factor content crosses a national 
border for production purposes. Domestic and foreign 
factor content in various production activities are distin-
guished using domestic input-output coefficient matrixes 
and import input-output coefficient matrixes in an inter-
country input- output table, including their local and global 
Leontief inverse matrixes.
From a factor content perspective a complete decomposi-
tion of a country- sector’s value added or final goods produc-
tion needs to consider both forward and backward industrial 
linkages (Wang and others 2017a). The forward linkage– 
based decomposition views a country- sector’s engagement 
in GVC activities from a producer perspective. It classifies as 
GVC production activities the portion of GDP created (in a 
country- sector) by domestic production factor content that 
crosses borders for production at least once. It classifies as 
domestic production the portion of GDP created by domes-
tic factor content that stays within national borders over the 
entire production process. It decomposes values but not 
goods. The backward industrial linkage–based decomposi-
tion views a country or sector’s engagement in GVC activi-
ties from a user perspective. It traces all primary factor inputs 
embodied in the final goods produced by the country- sector 
(continued)
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importing country. No indirect exports via third countries 
or re-exports or re-imports of the source countries’ factor 
content occur. For example, Chinese value added is embod-
ied in its steel exports to the United States and used in U.S. 
house construction. This is labeled V_GVC_S.
3b. Complex cross-border production-sharing activities, or 
complex GVCs. This involves domestic value added that is 
embodied in intermediate exports and used by a partner 
country to produce exports (intermediate or final) for other 
countries. Domestic factor content crosses the border at 
least twice and is used by the partner country to produce 
intermediate or final product exports either for re-export 
to the home country (such as an Apple engineer’s salary 
embodied in an iPhone bought by an American consumer) 
or for re-export to other countries (such as Japanese value 
added embodied in electronic chips installed in Chi-
na-made toy exports to the United States). This is labeled 
V_GVC_C.
to the original country- sector sources and consistently clas-
sifies embodied domestic or foreign factor content into GVC 
and non-GVC production activities based on whether they 
have crossed a national border for production.
Both ways to decompose production activities in a 
country-sector pair include the four types described in 
the text. Factor content or value added in types 1 and 2 
involves no cross-border production activities and satisfies 
domestic (type 1) and foreign (type 2) demand. Factor con-
tent or value added in type 2 crosses borders once but only 
for consumption activities since all value-added embodied 
in the good’s intermediate inputs are derived from domes-
tic sources; therefore, it is traditional trade in value added 
terms (French wine for English cloth). Factor content in 
type 3 is embodied in trade in intermediate goods and can 
be decomposed further into two types. Type 3a is value 
added embedded in intermediate goods absorbed by the 
direct importer and in which cross-border production activ-
ities are conducted, but only within the direct importing 
country (without further border crossing) — thus, these are 
simple GVCs. Type 3b is value added that crosses borders 
at least twice to satisfy domestic and foreign final demand, 
respectively — thus, these are complex GVCs. These last two 
types measure cross-country production-sharing activities. 
They exclude domestic value added measured by the first 
two types because those production activities are accom-
plished completely within national borders and so can be 
treated as pure domestic production activities.
Decomposing GDP and final goods production by country or sector
Forward linkage-based: Producer perspective 
Which types of GDP production activities belong to GVCs?
Backward linkage-based: User perspective 
Which types of final goods production belong to GVCs?
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BOX 2.2 (continued)
Identifying which types of production are global value chain activities and which are not
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Global value chain production activities in the 
global business cycle
The four types of value-added creation activities were decom-
posed following the GDP decomposition method proposed by 
Wang and others (2017a) and using the recently released World 
Input- Output Database (Timmer et. al. 2016). The global produc-
tion structures in different types of value-added creation activi-
ties were then plotted for the past two decades (figure 2.3).
The changing relative importance of different types of 
value-added creation activities in the global business cycle
Before the 2008–09 global financial crisis, the dominant trend in 
production activities was the decline of pure domestic produc-
tion activities. Although all trade-related production activities 
were increasing, cross-border GVC production-sharing activi-
ties were growing faster than traditional trade production activ-
ities. Then four important events affected the global production 
pattern.
• First, the financial crisis struck several Asian developing 
countries in 1997–98. GDP growth declined more than 1 per-
centage point, but trade in manufactured products was less 
affected (see figure 2.3; as shown later, the impact was mainly 
on pure domestic production).
• Second, the 2000–01 dot-com bust resulted in a minor set-
back for globalization that was similar to the effect of the 
2008–09 global financial crisis but on a much smaller scale. 
Pure domestic production activities increased, and cross-
border production-sharing activities (both simple and com-
plex GVCs) decreased in 2001.
• Third, as the global economy recovered in 2001 and China 
joined the WTO at the end of that year, production globaliza-
tion resumed in 2002 and accelerated from 2003 until 2008. 
Up dramatically were GVC production activities as a share 
of total global production, as were complex cross-border 
production- sharing activities as a share of total GVC produc-
tion activities (figure 2.4).
• Fourth, the 2008–09 global financial crisis caused a signifi-
cant setback in production globalization. The share of pure 
domestic production activities rose and the share of all 
trade-related production activities fell, especially the cross-
border production-sharing activities of complex GVCs (see 
figures 2.3 and 2.4). But unlike the recoveries after the 1997–
98 Asian financial crisis and the 2000–01 dot-com bust, the 
recovery after the 2008–09 global financial crisis was short. 
The production globalization trend not only slowed, but there 
were signs of reversal (see below).
The changing growth rate of different value-added 
creation activities in the global business cycle
Some stylized facts emerge from closer analysis of the rate of 
change for the different types of value-added creation activities 
FIGURE 2.3 Trends in production activities as a share of 
global GDP, by type of value-added creation activity, 
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year by year for the three growth periods and the three eco-
nomic downturns.
Before 2000–01, growth was slow for all types of value- 
added production activities, but GVCs, especially cross-border 
production-sharing activities of complex GVCs, increased every 
year, even during the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, and began to 
accelerate toward the end of the period (figure 2.5). Global econ-
omies took off in 2003–08 after the 2000–01 dot-com bust, and 
there was a dramatic expansion of GVCs, especially those with 
complex production-sharing activities. Economic recovery was 
rapid for two years following the 2008–09 global financial crisis. 
But the growth rate fell sharply for all types of GDP production in 
2012–14, with an obvious slowdown in cross-border production-
sharing GVC activities.
Before the 2000–01 dot-com bust and the 2008–09 global 
financial crisis, trade-related production activities, especially 
complex GVC production-sharing activities grew much faster 
than pure domestic production activities. During the crises, pure 
domestic production activities were least affected (0.5% in 2001 
and 1.7% in 2009). While the production of traditional trade was 
the second-least affected type of value-added creation activity, 
cross-border GVC production activities, especially for complex 
GVCs, were the most affected, falling 4% in 2001 and 17% in 
2009 for simple GVCs and 6% and 29% for complex GVCs. But 
the two types of GVC production activities also had the fastest 
postcrisis recovery. So, despite the difference in magnitude, the 
impact of the two economic crises on types of value-added cre-
ation activities was similar.
The impacts of the 2000–01 dot-com bust and the 2008–
09 global financial crisis on the global production pattern had 
many similarities, but the recoveries from the two shocks were 
very different. Although the recovery of production globaliza-
tion was quick in 2010 and 2011, the growth rate slowed signifi-
cantly after that. Total global GDP still grew during 2012–14, but 
in a reversed pattern. The growth of pure domestic production 
activities was slow but steady, faster than that of complex cross-
border production sharing activities, which had negative or near 
zero growth. And the growth of simple cross-border activities 
(those with only one border crossing) increased much faster than 
that of complex GVC activities. Both patterns were completely 
different from those during the earlier economic recoveries.
To minimize the impact of price fluctuations in crude oil and 
bulk commodities (the “commodity super-cycle”) on the nominal 
GDP growth rate in figure 2.5, growth rates were examined at 
the sector level (figure 2.6). The growth patterns just discussed 
still hold for both forward and backward linkage–based decom-
position of production activities, and there is no significant dif-
ference between manufacturing and services.
The new pattern of global production during the 
economic recovery after the global financial crisis
Signs of a different pattern of global production emerged during 
the slow economic recovery following the quick rebound in 2010 
and 2011. At the global level the share of both types of cross-
border production-sharing GVC activities declined, whereas 
the shares of pure domestic and traditional trade value-added 
creation activities increased, implying a nearly 3 percentage 
point decline in the aggregate GVC participation rate globally 
between 2011 and 2015 (figure 2.7).
To exclude the effects of fluctuations in commodity and crude 
oil prices, the decomposition is further broken down into four 
broad economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and 
services) and into both forward and backward industrial linkages. 
The results confirm the relative decline of GVC production activi-
ties (figure 2.8). The general pattern of change in the global pro-
duction structure among the four types of value-added creation 
activities holds for most sectors, except for the forward linkage–
based decomposition of pure domestic production in services 
FIGURE 2.5 Nominal growth rates of value-added creation activities during the global business cycle at the global level, 
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FIGURE 2.6 Nominal growth rates of value-added creation activities during the global business cycle at the 
manufacturing and services sector level, by forward and backward linkages, 1996–2014
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and the backward linkage–based decomposition of traditional 
trade in agriculture.
After 2011, complex GVC activities declined in all G7 coun-
tries and in major Asian emerging economies except Viet Nam 
(figure 2.9). In backward linkage–based decomposition the 
changes in simple GVC activities were mixed across countries. At 
the same time, implying weak domestic demand for major world 
economies, pure domestic production declined in almost all G7 
countries except the United States and in China and a few other 
emerging economies. The share of production for traditional 
trade, which satisfies foreign demand, increased for all G7 and 
most Asian emerging economies.
To ensure the robustness of these results, the changes in major 
portions of production activities based on the decomposition of 
both forward and backward linkages were compared for the four 
largest economies ranked by GDP — the United States, China, 
Japan, and Germany (figure 2.10). This analysis confirms the pro-
duction structure changes identified at the aggregate level.
The structure of value-added creation during the slow eco-
nomic recovery since 2011 is quite different from that during the 
three previous economic growth periods in the last 20 years. 
First, unlike the rapid production globalization driven by the 
growth of complex GVC activities in previous periods, during the 
current economic recovery the pattern was reversed, with less 
cross-border production-sharing activities in complex GVCs. 
Again contrary to the production structure of the previous eco-
nomic growth periods, the current economic recovery has been 
driven mainly by traditional trade production to satisfy foreign 
FIGURE 2.7 Structural changes in different types of value-
added creation activities at the global level between 
2011 and 2015
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FIGURE 2.8 Structural changes in different types of value-added creation activities at the sectoral level between 2011 and 2015
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demand and the growth of pure domestic production in the 
United States and several other major emerging economies, such 
as China. Finally, in the current growth period, participation in 
simple GVCs has been mixed, increasing for some developed 
economies but decreasing for most emerging Asian economies.
Factors behind the slow growth of GDP during the recent 
economic recovery
GDP growth has been slower during the recent economic recov-
ery than during the previous growth period (figure 2.11) for two 
key reasons:
• Weak domestic demand. The average annual growth rate of 
pure domestic production (orange points in figure 2.11) declined 
significantly, reflecting weak domestic demand for most econo-
mies. The growth rate of traditional trade production activities 
(blue points) for foreign demand actually grew more rapidly in 
the second period for most of the 48 economies in the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) data sample than in the first period.
• The slowdown of production globalization. The average 
growth rate of both complex GVC value-added creation activ-
ities (black points) and simple GVC activities (gray points) 
declined, with the average growth rate of complex GVC activ-
ities declining more.
The impact of these two factors is even clearer when the 48 
economies in the ADB database are divided into two groups 
based on positive and negative GDP growth during 2011–15 
(figure 2.12). Compared with GDP in 2011, GDP in 2015 increased 
in 24 economies and decreased in 24 economies. Decomposing 
the total GDP of each group into GVC and non-GVC production 
activities shows the following:
• The change in pure domestic production to meet domes-
tic demand explained the largest portion of the change 
in GDP for both groups; all economies with negative GDP 
growth experienced a significant decrease in pure domestic 
production.
• Traditional trade production increased, while cross-border 
production-sharing GVC activities decreased. In con-
trast, during the precrisis period (2003–08) cross-border 
production-sharing GVC activities grew much faster than tra-
ditional trade-related domestic production activities.
• The decline of cross-border production-sharing GVC activities 
was driven by complex GVC activities. Simple GVC activities 
FIGURE 2.9 Structural changes in different type of value-added creation activities between 2011 and 2015 at the 
country level
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FIGURE 2.10 Structural changes in different type of value-added creation activities between 2011 and 2015, at the 
country and sector levels
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declined in countries with negative GDP growth during 2012–
15 but kept growing in countries with positive GDP growth. 
Even in the country group with positive growth in total cross-
border production-sharing GVC activities, the production 
activities of complex GVCs declined. In contrast, complex GVC 
activities were the fastest growing portion of GDP production 
in most countries during the precrisis period (2003–08).
Network analysis based on decomposing bilateral gross trade 
flows, proposed by Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014), confirms 
the decline of complex GVC activities during 2011–15 (box 2.3).
Why complex cross-border production-sharing activities 
declined during the recovery following the financial crisis
What drives the recent pattern of global production? The mea-
sure of total and GVC production length proposed by Wang and 
others (2017b) can shed light on this question.
Average production length is a measure of the average time 
that value added created by production factors employed in a 
country or sector is counted as gross output in the economy. 
When value added is used as an input in a production stage, 
either as a primary or intermediate input, it is counted as gross 
output where it is used. Therefore, the length of a production 
chain is the number of times value added is counted as an output 
in the production chain from the first time it is used as a primary 
input until it is absorbed by a final product. It reflects the com-
plexity of production processes. So the finer the division of labor, 
the longer the production length, which can be computed as the 
ratio of value added to its induced gross output.
Newly released data from the World Input-Output Database 
(Timmer and others 2016) can be used to decompose produc-
tion length for the four types of value-added creation activities 
based on the decomposition of domestic value added into GVC 
and non-GVC activities (figure 2.13). The units here are the aver-
age number of stages in the production process: that is, at each 
stage, value added is counted as the gross output of some 
industry.
This decomposition of production length reveals several 
patterns. First, the breakdown of the production process into 
more stages is not a general phenomenon, either within or 
among countries. The length of domestic production chains 
is quite stable, though production chains for traditional trade 
increased very slightly. The main reason that production chains 
have lengthened, on average, is that the length of value-added 
production activities that cross national borders increased sig-
nificantly during 2002–12 for both simple and complex GVCs, 
but especially for complex GVCs. This pattern changed during 
the recovery period, however. At the global level, production 
length increased during 2011–15 for all value-added produc-
tion activities except complex GVC production, which declined 
(figure 2.14), running counter to its pattern in the precrisis 
period.
Second, the decline in production length of complex GVC 
activities can also be observed clearly at the sector level (figure 
2.15). For almost all country-sector pairs except agriculture and 
mining in emerging economies, the production length of com-
plex GVC activities declined. The decline in manufacturing was 
more severe in emerging economies than in advanced econo-
mies, and the opposite was true for the decline in services. The 
production length of simple GVC activities in manufacturing 
also increased in emerging economies but not as much as in 
advanced economies. The direction of change is again opposite 
for services in advanced economies.
FIGURE 2.11 Change in average annual growth rate by type of value-added creation activity between 2003–08 and 2011–15
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FIGURE 2.12 Changes in growth of different types of value-added creation activities between country groups with 
positive and those with negative GDP growth between 2011 and 2015
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BOX 2.3
The evolution of cross-border production sharing in complex global value chains
Given the complexity and sophistication of cross-border 
production-sharing, network analysis can illuminate the evo-
lution of global value chains (GVCs) (box figure). For simplic-
ity, the analysis considers vertical specialization (Hummels, 
Ishii, and Yi 2001) as an example and uses network tools 
(Zhong and others 2014) to show the topology of foreign 
value added embodied in manufactured exports (one part 
of complex GVCs) at the bilateral level.
In 2000 the entire network was dispersed, and the Euro-
pean community (with Germany as the core) had no con-
nection with the Asia–Pacific community. The United States 
was the core of the Asia–Pacific community, with strong 
connections to Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Australia. The 
United States also had a “chain” connection with Japan 
through the Republic of Korea and had connections with 
China through Korea and Chinese Taipei. Korea and Chinese 
Taipei, a sub-hub in the Asia Pacific community, were linked 
with most Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
economies.
In 2005 the Asia Pacific community separated into two 
groups: the United States maintained connections only with 
Canada and Mexico, while China became the new core of 
the East Asia + Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
community, with strong connections to Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, and Chinese Taipei.
In 2011 dramatic changes were evident across the entire 
network, and the magnitude of connections strengthened. 
China became the core of the Asia–Pacific community by 
transferring a large portion of foreign value added to other 
countries. The relative distance between the European and 
Asia–Pacific communities shortened, reflecting that com-
plex GVCs had developed globally, and more countries 
joined GVCs through some of the main hubs (the United 
States, China, Germany, and the Republic of Korea).
In 2015 a recession likely occurred in the complex GVCs 
networks; in particular, the North American Free Trade Area, 
East Asia + ASEAN, and Europe were again isolated. This 
phenomenon is consistent with the decline of complex GVCs.
The typology of foreign value added embedded in bilateral manufactured exports, 2000–15
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Finally, the main reason for the decline in complex GVC pro-
duction length is the declining number of national border cross-
ings for production. The production length before and after 
national border crossing actually increased, indicating the poten-
tial deepening division of labor within national borders despite 
the decline in cross-border production-sharing activities. The 
reduced number of national border crossings for production 
can be observed in every country in the ADB database (figure 
2.16), regardless of whether its GDP grew or declined during this 
period.
Caution is required in interpreting these conclusions because 
official statistics always lag behind the real world economy. For 
example, many aspects of new economies, such as cross-border 
business- to- business e-commerce, are not easy to measure 
under the current national account system, so the analysis may 
underestimate cross-border production-sharing activities. How-
ever, stylized facts on changes in the global production structure 
as summarized from the data are consistent with the following 
factors.
• The rising tide of protection around the globe after the global 
financial crisis.
• The substitution of domestically produced intermediate 
inputs for imported intermediate inputs in major emerging 
economies, such as China. When the domestic division of 
labor deepens in emerging economies, more intermediate 
inputs are produced domestically, so the domestic value 
chain lengthens, and cross-border production-sharing activ-
ities may decline as major emerging economies upgrade 
along GVCs.
• Technological innovation and reshoring also deepen the 
domestic division of labor for major developed economies, 
such as the United States and Japan.
It remains to be seen whether such changes are temporary or 
permanent.
Measuring smile curves in global value chains: 
Creation and distribution of value added and 
job opportunities
From a development perspective, GVCs have at least three 
positive aspects. First, by linking into GVCs, firms, especially in 
FIGURE 2.13 Trend in production length by different types 
of value-added creation activities, world average, 2000–14
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FIGURE 2.14 Change in production length for different types of value-added creation activities at the global level 
between 2011 and 2015
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FIGURE 2.15 Change in production length for different types of value-added creation activities at the sector and 
economy levels between 2011 and 2015
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FIGURE 2.16 The decline in the number of border crossings drives the declining length of global value chain production 
at the country level between 2011 and 2015
Difference in number of border crossings between 2011 and 2015
Change in nominal GDP, 2011–15 (%)
–40 –20 0 20 40 60 80 100
–0.3
–0.2
–0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5 Before first border crossing
Number of border crossing
After first border crossing
Source: University of International Business and Economics global value chain indexes derived from 2016 Asian Development Bank Inter-Country Input-Output Tables.
54 • Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development
developing economies, do not need to build the entire course 
of production capacity for a product. Instead, they can use their 
comparative advantage to concentrate on a specific production 
process or task, which enables them to integrate into the global 
economy more rapidly than was possible in the previous industri-
alization period (Kowalski and others 2015). Second, becoming a 
part of GVCs can create more job opportunities (UNCTAD 2013). 
For example, jobs are created in developing countries through 
iPhone assembly in China, call center operations in the Philip-
pines and India, Nike shoe production in Viet Nam, and automo-
bile and auto parts production in Mexico and Thailand. Third, 
GVCs also provide the opportunity for technology transfers or 
spillovers from developed countries to developing countries 
through local learning (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2010; Kawakami 
and Sturgeon 2012).
However, as mentioned in OECD, WTO, and World Bank 
Group (2014, p. 4), “Gains from GVC participation are not auto-
matic. Benefits of GVCs can also vary considerably depending 
on whether a country operates at the high or at the low end of 
the value chain.” Thus, developed and developing countries may 
face quite different costs and risks in joining GVCs (Baldwin, Ito, 
and Sato 2014). Because of differences in comparative advan-
tage across countries in GVC participation, developed countries 
tend to engage in high-end and intangible production activities, 
such as research and development, design, and brand building 
in the prefabrication stages and in after-sales services and mar-
keting in the postfabrication stages. Thus, these countries may 
worry about the hollowing out of their economies as manufac-
turing jobs are offshored to low-technology, low-wage countries. 
Developing countries, in contrast, tend to focus on low-end and 
tangible production activities such as manufacturing and assem-
bly. So, they may worry that they are getting the wrong types of 
jobs and that their economies could be locked in to the bottom 
of the GVC “smile curve,” which presents an outline of the value-
added potential of each production stage in a value chain for 
various industries.
The concept of the smile curve was first proposed around 
1992 by Stan Shih, the founder of Acer, a technology company 
headquartered in Chinese Taipei (Shih 1996). In the personal 
computer industry, Shih observed that both ends of the value 
chain bring higher value added to the product than the middle 
part. The logic of the smile curve has been widely used and 
discussed in the context of GVCs. However, most research has 
focused on product-level case studies rather than the economy-
wide implications.
Smile curves can help answer numerous questions at the econ-
omy level. What is the relationship between developed and devel-
oping countries in the creation and distribution of value added 
and job opportunities in GVCs? Do smile curves exist for country 
or industry GVCs? If yes, have smile curves deepened or flattened 
over the years? Have developing countries been locked into the 
low end of GVCs? Which policies can help countries maintain or 
improve their competitiveness on the smile curve? And how can 
developing countries integrate into GVCs successfully and then 
move up from the low end to the high end of the smile curve? 
Answers to these questions are crucial for designing development 
strategies, industrial policies, and international governance. This 
section considers several highly fragmented exporting industries 
in some countries to show how value added and job opportunities 
are created and distributed in GVCs along various smile curves.
China’s information and communication technology 
industry export-related smile curves: Distribution of value 
added and job opportunities
Ye, Meng, and Wei (2015) and Meng, Ye, and Wei (2017) consis-
tently measure both the value-added gain from GVC participa-
tion and the distance (total production length) between produc-
ers and consumers. Following their approach, smile curves can 
be drawn for various GVCs. A good starting point would be the 
iPhone, labeled “Designed by Apple in California; assembled in 
China.” But it is difficult to isolate the iPhone industry in exist-
ing intercountry input- output databases. Here, the first step is 
to examine the information and communication technology (ICT) 
industry (industry 14, Electrical and Optical Equipment, in the 
World Input-Output Database) as a proxy to show how, and to 
what extent, countries and industries are involved in the GVCs 
for China’s ICT product exports.
In figures 2.17 and 2.18 the y-axis shows labor compensation 
per hour (a proxy for technology level or a first-order approxima-
tion of labor productivity in current U.S. dollars), and the x-axis 
denotes distance, measured by the total forward linkage–based 
production length between global consumers of ICT products 
and a specific participating industry in the corresponding GVC. 
The 2013 version of World Input-Output Database data are used 
here, covering 41 economies and 35 industries, with the total 
number of GVC participants (41 × 35 = 1,435) represented as a 
circle in the figure. The size of the circle represents the absolute 
value added gained by joining the corresponding GVC (thresh-
old equals 0.1% of the total value added gain). The smooth line 
is fitted by local polynomial regression–smoothing weighted by 
its value-added gain, and the shadowed area represents the con-
fidence interval around the smooth line. Using the smile curve 
can lead to an understanding of the participants (countries and 
industries) of a specific GVC as well as their positions and gains 
in the chain.
The plotted GVC for China’s ICT exports to the world market 
clearly appears as a smile curve; to save space, only values for 
1995 and 2009 are shown (see figures 2.17 and 2.18). Several styl-
ized facts emerge from these curves:
• China had the largest value-added gain in this GVC. China’s 
ICT industry (CHN14) was the most affected industry based 
on China’s production of ICT exports through domestic back-
ward and intra-industrial linkages.
• Several other Chinese domestic industries whose lowest 
labor compensation placed them at the low end of the smile 
curve also benefited by participating in prefabrication stages 
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FIGURE 2.17 Estimated smile curve for China’s exports of electrical and optical equipment, 1995
Compensation per hour ($)
Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017.
Note: See annex 2.2 for a key to country abbreviations and sector codes.
FIGURE 2.18 Estimated smile curve for China’s exports of electrical and optical equipment, 2009
Compensation per hour ($)
Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017.
Note: See annex 2.2 for a key to country abbreviations and sector codes.
56 • Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development
of this GVC (CHN12 basic metals, CHN28 financial interme-
diation, CHN20 wholesale, CHN9 chemicals, CHN30 renting 
of machinery and equipment and other business activities, 
CHN2 mining, CHN10 rubber and plastics). This was due to 
the fact that most intermediate inputs needed directly and 
indirectly to produce China’s ICT exports were presumed to 
come from the Chinese domestic market.
• ICT industries in other economies (DEU14, USA14, JPN14, 
KOR14, TWN14), located in the upstream portion of this GVC, 
also obtained a relatively large part of the value-added gain. 
The main reason is that a majority of transactions involved 
cross-border, intra-industry trade, given the broad indus-
try classification in the World Input-Output Database. This 
result is also consistent with the finding of a case study of the 
iPhone’s supply chain that Japan, the Republic of Korea, Chi-
nese Taipei, and the United States were the main suppliers 
of parts and components for iPhone assembly in China (Xing 
and Detert 2010).
• Renting machinery and equipment and other business activi-
ties (30) and financial intermediation (28) provided by foreign 
countries (USA30, USA28, JPN30, JPN28, KOR30, and KOR28) 
are located at the high end of the prefabrication stages of 
this GVC, with higher labor compensation. ICT products pro-
duced in China, dominated by foreign-invested enterprises, 
may need inputs of intermediate services directly imported 
from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
But this kind of service may also be embodied in the inter-
mediate goods produced in the United States, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea and exported to China to support the 
production of China’s ICT goods indirectly through various 
GVC routes.
• Postfabrication service industries with higher labor compen-
sation per hour — such as wholesale (20) and inland transpor-
tation (23) in the United States, Japan, Germany, and France 
— were the main beneficiaries in the postfabrication stage of 
this GVC. China’s ICT goods exported to the United States, 
Japan, and Germany had to be delivered to their domestic 
consumers mainly through those countries’ domestic whole-
sale and transportation service industries.
Changes in China’s information and communication 
technology industry export-related smile curves over time
China’s ICT industry was located at the low end of the GVC in 
1995 and that position did not change much between 1995 and 
2009 — for two likely reasons. One is the relatively high share of 
processing trade in this industry, which can explain China’s posi-
tion on the x-axis of figures 2.17 and 2.18 measuring production 
distance. China’s participation in the GVC at the early stage 
reflects its acceptance of outsourcing tasks such as assembling 
iPhones. Compared with the traditional production of ICT prod-
ucts, assembly is much more labor-intensive and depends on 
more foreign parts and components. In addition, export prod-
ucts processed in China are intended for export only (no domes-
tic consumption), so more foreign after-service industries have 
been involved in the postfabrication stages in this GVC than 
might otherwise be the case. Thus, China’s ICT value-added 
activities are naturally located in the middle of this smile curve. 
Another reason is that labor compensation per hour in current 
U.S. dollars increased slightly during the target years but not to 
a very high level because of the abundant labor supply in China. 
This explains the almost unchanged position of China’s ICT on 
the y-axis.
The confidence interval of the smile curve widened consider-
ably between 1995 and 2009. This widening was driven mainly 
by the expanding differentials for labor compensation per hour 
among GVC participants. The labor compensation of U.S. ICT 
workers (USA14) soared from $18.10 an hour in 1995 to $52.20 
in 2009, while for China (CHN14) labor compensation went up 
only slightly, from $0.60 an hour in 1995 to $1.60 in 2009. In other 
words, the U.S. ICT industry concentrated increasingly on high-
tech production of more complex intermediate goods (such as 
computer processors), as China took on more tasks using its low-
skilled labor (such as assembling final products). Also changing 
the confidence interval is the deep involvement of more foreign 
and Chinese domestic service industries in this GVC, who wanted 
a large share of the value-added gain.
China’s other domestic participating industries are at the low 
end of the smile curve, but their value-added gain has risen in 
absolute terms (note the change in circle size between 1995 and 
2009 in figures 2.17 and 2.18). In other words, China’s domestic 
industries, without directly exporting goods to the world market, 
also participate in GVCs by providing intermediate goods and 
services to its exporting industries, like ICT.
Global value chains can also frown
For an inverted smile curve, consider value-added activities in 
the German auto industry. Given the higher labor compensation 
in Germany’s auto industry and lower labor compensation in 
both upstream and downstream industries, the entire GVC looks 
like an inverted smile curve — a frown (figures 2.19 and 2.20). To 
some extent, this may reflect the successful transition of the 
German auto industry from traditional mass producer to mass 
customizer and to individual design based on digital technology 
and artificial intelligence. The mass customized and individual 
design manufacturing stage accounts for a relatively large por-
tion of the total value gain, while the traditional high-end design 
and sales functions account for only a small portion of total value 
gain and mostly in foreign countries. This is contrary to intuitions 
from the smile curve, in which traditional manufacturing stands 
at the low end of the GVC, such as China’s ICT exports. But it 
could also reflect the ongoing structural change in global GVCs, 
such as the emergence of the customer to manufacturing busi-
ness model in several industries.
The most important changes between 1995 and 2009 were 
the increasing number and variation of foreign participants and 
the increasing length of the curve. In 1995 developed Euro-
pean countries, the United States, and Japan dominated foreign 
participants, while in 2009 more countries and industries were 
involved, especially in Eastern Europe, China, and the Repub-
lic of Korea. This clearly reflects the increasing diversity and 
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FIGURE 2.19 Estimated smile curve for Germany’s automobile exports production, 1995
Compensation per hour ($)
Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017.
Note: See annex 2.2 for a key to country abbreviations and sector codes.
FIGURE 2.20 Estimated smile curve for Germany’s automobile exports production, 2009
Compensation per hour ($)
Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017.
Note: See annex 2.2 for a key to country abbreviations and sector codes.
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FIGURE 2.21 Labor productivity and income distribution for the United States, 1995–2009
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FIGURE 2.22 Labor productivity and income distribution for China, 1995–2009
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complexity of international fragmentation in Germany’s auto 
exports. In addition, given the increase in labor compensation 
and absolute value-added gain in Germany’s auto industry and 
the relatively low labor compensation of upstream participants 
from China, the slope of the entire curve became much steeper.
Labor productivity and income distribution in global 
value chains
Smile curve mapping can be a touchstone for better understand-
ing various country and industry positions and value-added gains 
from participating in GVCs. The empirical results presented so far 
raise an important issue about the relation between economic effi-
ciency and income (or job opportunity) distribution along GVCs 
from the perspective of economic development. Following Meng, 
Ye, and Wei (2017), this section considers the ICT industry, an 
industry dominated by international production sharing, and the 
construction industry, one of the most domestic- oriented indus-
tries (relatively less influenced by international trade). It also con-
siders the United States and China as country comparisons since 
both are active in GVCs. The United States joins GVCs mainly from 
upstream — such as exporting complex intermediate goods, parts, 
and components — or through foreign direct investment outflows 
to developing countries. China joins GVCs mainly from downstream 
— such as exporting assembled final goods — or through foreign 
direct investment inflows (before the global financial crisis).
U.S. labor productivity (measured as output per person eco-
nomically engaged, in 2009 national currency) increased rapidly 
from 1995 to 2009 as the U.S. economy became more efficient, 
with income distribution between capital and labor a relatively 
stable in their shares in total value added (figure 2.21). But high-
skilled workers received more job opportunities, with increased 
compensation per hour, while medium- and low-skilled workers 
lost jobs gradually, with only a small increase in pay for medium-
skilled workers and almost no change in compensation for low-
skilled workers over the 15 years for which data are available. 
This phenomenon was more pronounced in ICT industries, while 
no significant change was observed in the income distribution 
between skilled and unskilled workers in construction. In other 
words, the rise of GVCs (and technological innovation) may lead 
to greater efficiency in the U.S. economy but may also leave low-
skilled workers worse off, especially in industries with more out-
sourcing of production tasks to low-wage developing countries 
such as China.
For the same industries in China, the evolution is very differ-
ent, but it may be highly correlated with the U.S. phenomenon. 
China’s labor productivity also increased, but more value added 
was distributed to capital than to labor (figure 2.22). The gain 
accrued to the capital deployed in China, and that would include 
multinational corporations involved in GVCs. Given this, and the 
very large portion of low-skilled workers in China’s domestic 
labor market, the slow growth in compensation per hour for low-
skilled workers should come as no surprise.
China, with the world’s largest pool of low-skilled labor, meets 
the United States, the world’s largest capital-abundant coun-
try, through GVCs. This intersection generates very different 
but highly correlated income distribution changes. The United 
States is facing the challenge of job offshoring for medium- and 
low-skilled workers and downward pressure on their wages. 
Until 2009, China faced the challenge of unequal income distri-
bution between capital and labor, with very low compensation 
for low-skilled labor. In the United States the big winners appear 
to be high-skilled workers and multinational corporations. GVCs 
enabled them to benefit from the enormous productivity gains in 
developing countries such as China. In China, by contrast, ordi-
nary workers benefited. Even at the beginning of the process, 
factory wages in China were far ahead of rural incomes. And 
those wages doubled over 15 years. This is one of the driving fac-
tors behind the impressive decline of absolute poverty in China. 
But the really big benefits in China accrued to the small number 
of high-skilled workers and to the owners of capital, including 
foreign investors.
In summary, while developed and developing countries may 
face quite different costs and risks in joining GVCs, doing so may 
lead to efficiency improvements. But without proper domestic 
labor market adjustment policies and universal-coverage safety 
nets, as well as better international governance, medium-skilled 
and especially low-skilled workers can become the most easily 
injured groups in both developed and developing economies.
Conclusions
The rise of GVCs has dramatically changed the world economy. 
After explaining the changing patterns of global GDP and trade 
growth and the limitation of traditional trade indicators, this 
chapter showed how to use the most recent GVC indicators to 
decompose country and sector GDP and final goods production 
into GVC and non-GVC activities. These new indicators were also 
used to identify the production length and degree of participa-
tion (simple or complex) in GVCs at the country and sector levels. 
This analysis found that complex GVC-related cross-border pro-
duction-sharing activities were the most important force driving 
globalization and the growth of global GDP during 1995–2000 
and 2000–08 before declining during 2012–15.
Why did complex GVC activities decline? As industrial upgrad-
ing occurred in emerging economies, especially in China, pro-
cessing trade declined. Trade protectionism may have increased 
due to the slow pace of economic recovery after the 2008–09 
global financial crisis. And some types of manufacturing jobs 
may have returned to source countries (reshoring) in response to 
technology innovation.
Smile curve analysis was used to show how these new phe-
nomena affect the distribution of value added and job oppor-
tunities in GVCs across countries. This analysis shows that coun-
tries and sectors can achieve very different value added and job 
gains along GVCs depending on their position and degree of 
participation. Joining a GVC increases economic efficiency, but 
this can have a distributional impact. The remaining chapters in 
this report discuss how to resolve the distribution issue and help 
participants from developing countries move up the smile curve.
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ANNEX 2.1
Shifting roles in global value chains for intermediate and final goods
Rising impact of Eastern European economies in intra-
Europe exchanges of intermediate products
During the last two decades, especially since joining the Euro-
pean Union in 2004, Eastern European countries have developed 
intensive bilateral trade linkages in industrial inputs with other 
European countries (figure A2.1.1). Joining the European Union 
and adopting EU regulations have been conducive to the devel-
opment of these ties within European GVCs. The Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, and Poland, the largest players in intraregional 
trade in manufacturing inputs among the European economies, 
accounted for more than 11% of intra-Europe exports in inter-
mediate goods in 2015, a share that more than quadrupled since 
1995.
Germany is by far the main trading partner for Eastern Euro-
pean economies in both regional and global value chains, 
with most of the trade involving intermediate rather than final 
goods. The share of intermediate goods in total Eastern Euro-
pean exports to Germany fluctuated around 60% between 1995 
and 2015. In the same period, Germany accounted for 30% of 
Poland’s exports and 27% of its imports of manufacturing inputs. 
The shares for the Czech Republic stood at 36% and 32%. The two 
economies’ main trade with Germany is in medium-technology 
intermediates related to chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals), 
machinery and equipment, and motor vehicles. Furthermore, the 
comparable size of exports and imports of manufacturing inputs 
between the two economies and Germany ($55 billion and 
$48 billion in 2015) suggests the two-way trade usually found in 
supply chains, with Germany acting both upstream and down-
stream for its Eastern European partners.
Figure A2.1.2 highlights the divergence of final and interme-
diate exports from the Polish motor vehicles industry after 2009 
and reveals a change in the position and role of Poland in Euro-
pean car production chains. Poland reduced its exports of final 
cars while developing a specialization in the upstream produc-
tion of medium- and high-technology car parts. The production 
and export of final cars are facilitated by other European part-
ners, such as the Czech Republic, that increasingly export auto-
mobiles for various foreign car makers to the European market 
($4.5 billion in 2015, with a 2000–15 average growth rate of 8%).
Poland’s upgrading along the production chain is also con-
firmed through its bilateral trade with Czech industries. Bilateral 
exports of manufacturing inputs between Poland and the Czech 
Republic increased rapidly between 2000 and 2015, at an aver-
age annual rate of 13.7%. Poland is a net exporter to the Czech 
Republic ($7.1 billion exports of manufacturing inputs versus 
$3.5 billion imports), and the Czech Republic’s share in Poland’s 
FIGURE A2.1.1 Eastern European economies’ trade of 
intermediate manufactured goods with Europe, 1995–2015
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Bilateral 
Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use database, International Standard In-
dustrial Classification, Revision 4 (2016 edition).
FIGURE A2.1.2 Poland’s exports of final and intermediate 
goods (motor vehicles) to Germany, 2000–15
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dustrial Classification, Revision 4 (2016 edition).
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total exports of manufacturing inputs doubled during that 
period, reaching 8% in 2015.
In 2015 approximately 80% of the intermediate goods 
exchanged between the two countries relied on medium tech-
nologies. Between 2000 and 2015 a significant shift occurred 
between the medium–low and the medium–high technology 
inputs exchanged by the two economies. The share of medium–
high goods Poland exported to the Czech Republic rose 13 per-
centage points while that of medium–low intermediate goods 
fell almost proportionally, reflecting a larger upgrade of Polish 
manufacturing industries in the European production chains than 
of its neighbor’s manufacturing industries (figure A2.1.3). This is 
largely a result of the substantial increase in Poland’s exports to 
the Czech Republic in motor vehicles and transport equipment. 
Exports from the two sectors rose by around 27% a year on aver-
age between 2000 and 2015, when they made up nearly 50% 
($3.4 billion) of Poland’s exports of manufacturing inputs to the 
Czech Republic.
The inverse evolution is observed for medium technology 
exports from the Czech Republic to Poland. Between 2000 and 
2015 Czech industries gradually began to specialize in medium–
low technology intermediate goods for export to Poland, and 
bilateral exports of medium–high technology goods fell. This 
is the typical situation in GVCs: partner countries specialize in 
industrial technologies and tasks that complement each other. 
Poland took the lead for the production and export of medium–
high technology inputs, while the Czech Republic specialized in 
medium–low technology.
The share of high-technology intermediates in Czech exports 
to Poland increased between 2000 and 2015, reaching 4.2% of 
total inputs sent to Poland, thus reflecting a high level of special-
ization for some Czech companies and raising the potential of 
developing foreign market share.
The Czech Republic’s exports to Poland are quite diversified, 
mainly machinery equipment, chemicals, and motor vehicles. 
The share of motor parts exports to Poland decreased drastically 
in 2000–15 as Poland took the lead and upgraded in that indus-
try. In contrast, exports to Poland from the machinery sector 
(medium–low technology) increased 10-fold.
Rising role of Mexico in intra-NAFTA trade in 
intermediate manufactured goods
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) exports of manufac-
turing inputs for Canada, Mexico, and the United States were 
52.6% in 2015, up from 45.4% in 1995, indicating that supply 
chains have been developed and consolidated.
One major feature of the evolution of intra-NAFTA trade is 
the growing role of Mexico in the exchange of manufacturing 
inputs among NAFTA countries (figure A2.1.4). Mexico’s share in 
intra-NAFTA trade of intermediate goods increased continuously 
between 1995 and 2015, while Canada’s share declined progres-
sively and the U.S. share varied within a large range. Although 
the United States was the main destination of intra-NAFTA 
exports of industrial inputs over the period, with a 24.5% share in 
2015, Mexico rose and surpassed Canada as the second export 
destination within NAFTA, receiving 15.3% of NAFTA exports 
of industrial inputs in 2015. Mexico’s GVC-related trade in inter-
mediate goods is essentially with the United States, with 83% of 
Mexico’s exports in manufacturing intermediates destined for 
the United States in 2015.
Mexico developed its exports of inputs to the United 
States mainly in machinery and transport equipment, which 
accounted for 70.4% of Mexico’s exports of intermediate man-
ufactured goods to the United States in 2015 ($51 billion for 
machinery and $32 billion for transport equipment). Within 
machinery, the electrical machinery and apparatus sector 
FIGURE A2.1.3 Bilateral exports of Poland and Czech Republic, by manufacturing technology, 2000 and 2015
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amounted to half the exported intermediate goods in 2015. 
Exports of auto parts to the United States, $29 billion in 2015, 
had the fastest growth of all exporting industries to the United 
States in 2009–15, an annual average of 18.4%. In recent years 
Mexico supplanted Canada as the main provider of automotive 
components to the U.S. market. And Mexico’s imports of auto 
parts from the United States grew at a similar pace (16.8% on 
average between 2009 and 2015), but at a slightly lower mag-
nitude ($22 billion).
Mexico not only trades car components with the United 
States but also exports final vehicles. In 2015 Mexico became 
the world’s seventh largest car producer and the largest in Latin 
America, with 3.4 million vehicles. A comparison of the growth 
of Mexico’s car exports to the United States with its trade in car 
parts (import and exports) finds that the three trade flows fol-
lowed similar upward trends, with average increases of 17–19% 
between 2009 and 2015 (figure A2.1.5). This highlights the inter-
dependency between the export of final cars and the import of 
parts and accessories when growth in vehicle production inevita-
bly leads to an increased demand for imports of car parts and a 
wider range of components for assembly companies.
Shifts in the division of labor in Asian global value chains
Over the past two decades production networks in Asia have 
developed tremendously and have become increasingly 
fragmented, providing incentives and opportunities to less- 
industrialized economies to join the manufacturing process. For 
instance, labor-intensive assembling of final goods used to be 
the major comparative advantage of China, but such assembly is 
now being transferred out of China as emerging economies from 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have been increas-
ingly integrated into Factory Asia.
China still runs large trade surpluses in final goods with EU 
countries and the United States, along with a trade deficit in 
intermediate goods with other industrial countries. But it has 
already become an important supplier of manufactured interme-
diate goods for many lower-wage countries in its neighborhood, 
such as Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Sim-
ilar to China, these emerging Asian economies all run surpluses 
FIGURE A2.1.4 Intra-NAFTA trade in intermediate manufactured goods, by main destination and origin, 1995, 2005, and 2015
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FIGURE A2.1.5 Mexico’s trade with the United States in 
final and intermediate goods related to motor vehicles, 
1995–2015
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FIGURE A2.1.6 Evolution of net trade in intermediate and final manufactured goods of Cambodia and Thailand with 
China, the European Union, and the United States, 2000–15 and 1991–2015
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FIGURE A2.1.7 Evolution of net trade in intermediate and final textile products of Cambodia and Viet Nam with China 
and the world, 2000–15
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on manufactured final goods with the United States and EU coun-
tries (figure A2.1.6). Despite the fact that China is still a global 
center for the final assembly of numerous manufactured prod-
ucts, some labor-intensive final assembly activities have shifted 
to other low-cost economies.
Breaking down Asian trade by sector and end-use accord-
ing to Organisation for economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment technology intensity also reveals triangular trade relations 
(figure A2.1.7). Less developed economies, such as Cambodia, 
partnered with China in the textile industry, mainly by importing 
low-technology fabrics for manufacturing final goods for EU and 
U.S. consumer markets.
The level and type of industrial partnership between South-
east Asian economies and China depend on their endow-
ment and stage of development. As illustrated in figure A2.1.7, 
low- and middle-income countries, such as Cambodia and 
Viet Nam, absorb labor-intensive manufacturing inputs from 
China for their production and export. Upper-middle-income 
countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, and larger economies, 
such as India, tend to import medium–low or medium–high tech-
nology inputs from China since they have already upgraded in 
the chain and have the industrial capacity to produce and export 
high-technology products.
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ANNEX 2.2
Key to country abbreviations and sector codes
TABLE A2.2.1 Country abbreviations
AUS Australia
AUT Austria
BEL Belgium
BGR Bulgaria
BRA Brazil
CAN Canada
CHN China
CYP Cyprus
CZE Czech Republic
DEU Germany
DNK Denmark
ESP Spain
EST Estonia
FIN Finland
FRA France
GBR United Kingdom
GRC Greece
HUN Hungary
IDN Indonesia
IND India
IRL Ireland
ITA Italy
JPN Japan
KOR Korea, Rep.
LTU Lithuania
LUX Luxembourg
LVA Latvia
MEX Mexico
MLT Malta
NLD Netherlands
POL Poland
PRT Portugal
ROM Romania
RUS Russian Federation
SVK Slovak Republic
SVN Slovenia
SWE Sweden
TUR Turkey
TWN Chinese Taipei
USA United States
RoW Rest of the world
Source: World Input-Output Database, 2013 release.
TABLE A2.2.2 Sector codes
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
2 Mining and quarrying
3 food, beverages, and tobacco
4 Textiles and textile products
5 Leather, leather and footwear
6 Wood and products of wood and cork
7 Pulp, paper, paper, printing, and publishing
8 Coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel
9 Chemicals and chemical products
10 Rubber and plastics
11 Other nonmetallic mineral
12 Basic metals and fabricated metal
13 Machinery, not elsewhere classified
14 Electrical and optical equipment
15 Transport equipment
16 Manufacturing, not elsewhere classified; recycling
17 Electricity, gas, and water supply
18 Construction
19 Sale, maintenance, and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
retail sale of fuel
20 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles
21 Retail Trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
household goods
22 Hotels and restaurants
23 Inland transport
24 Water transport
25 Air transport
26 Other supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies
27 Post and telecommunications
28 Financial intermediation
29 Real estate activities
30 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business 
activities
31 Public administration and defense; compulsory social security
32 Education
33 Health and social work
34 Other community, social, and personal services
35 Private households with employed persons
Source: World Input-Output Database, 2013 release.
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Notes
1. This means that the production of final goods and services can be 
classified as GVC production only when it is combined with foreign 
factor content (value added) or returned domestic value added. See 
backward industrial linkages based on the decomposition in Wang 
and others (2017a) for details. The production of foreign affiliates 
may also be considered a type of GVC activity since current resi-
dence-based national account rules treat all firms within national bor-
ders as domestic firms; therefore, they treat foreign affiliates’ value-
added creation as part of domestic GDP production. No intercountry 
input-output table currently exists that can be used to separate pro-
duction activities between domestic firms and foreign affiliates. So 
the GDP decomposition method here may underestimate GVC pro-
duction activities.
2. In David Ricardo’s time, exports were 100% domestically produced 
value added, while today, foreign value added is always embodied 
in final product exports from a country; therefore, domestically pro-
duced value added becomes only a part of exports. However, using 
the decomposition method applied here, we are still able to compute 
the portion of “classical trade” analytically.
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